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THE REORGANIZATION OF TRADE
POLICYMAKING: PROSPECTS AND
PROBLEMS
Thomas R. Graham
After decades of international economic preeminence, the competitive
position of the United States in the world economy drastically deteriorated
in the 1970's. The organization of the U.S. executive branch was
inadequate to cope with this deterioration. Years of easy successes in
international trade caused the United States to take this preeminence for
granted, leaving the United States without a coherent national trade policy
or an effective means of promoting U.S. exports. Instead, many federal
agencies took uncoordinated and often contradictory actions affecting U.S.
trade.' Frequently, these actions subordinated the interest in promoting
U.S. trade competitiveness to other U.S. policy goals in areas such as
antitrust, tax, and the environment.
In 1979, conclusion of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN)2 provided an occasion for a reassessment of the U.S.
approach to trade. The MTN produced a series of new international
agreements that, together with the already existing General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade,3 were intended to reduce barriers to trade. Congress
t Resident Associate, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington,
D.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, American University Law School and the Georgetown
University Law Center. Former Deputy General Counsel to the President's Special Trade
Representative. B.A. 1965, Indiana University; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School.
1. See note 38 infra and accompanying text.
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), note 3 infra, sponsors periodic
"rounds" of negotiations to further promote international trade. The Tokyo Round, involving
some ninety-nine nations, was the seventh such round and was held in 1974-79 at Geneva,
Switzerland. These negotiations will be referred to as the "Tokyo Round" and as the "MTN."
For background on the Tokyo Round, see Graham, Reforming the International Trading
System: The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1
(1979); Wolff, The U.S. Mandate for Trade Negotiations 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 505 (1976).
3. Opened/or signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-l, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
The agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version is
contained in 4 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND
SELECTED DOCUMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as GATT]. GATT is
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implemented these new agreements for the United States by enacting the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979.4 U.S. negotiators and members of the
Congress viewed the MTN agreements and the Trade Agreements Act as
opportunities to redress the declining U.S. trade position by opening up
new export markets for U.S. products.
The United States, however, could not fully exploit these opportunities
under the existing institutional framework for trade policymaking.
Accordingly, the Senate Finance Committee and the House Ways and
Means Committee refused to approve the Trade Agreements Act until
President Carter produced a satisfactory proposal for executive
reorganization. 5 In response, the President produced a draft reorganization
plan which, after final negotiations between the executive and members of
Congress, he formally submitted to the Congress on September 25, 1979.6
President Carter subsequently implemented this plan by issuing an
a body of rules, as well as an international organization which services these rules, formulated
in 1947 to promote and maintain an open international trading system. For background
information on GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969).
4. Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A.
(West 1980)).
5. Congress exercised influence over the content of the President's proposal in an unusual
manner. Prior to the President's formal submission to Congress of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979, Congress, during informal consultations, insisted that the Act contain a requirement
that the President submit a reorganization proposal by July 10, 1979. Accordingly, section
1109 of the Act contained such a requirement specifying that:
In developing his proposal, the President shall consider, among other possibilities,
strengthening the coordination and functional responsibilities of the Office of the,
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations to include, among other things,
representation of the United States in all matters before the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, the establishment of a board of trade with a coordinating
mechanism in the Executive Office of the President, and the establishment of a
Department of International Trade and Investment. The recommendations of the
President, as embodied in such proposal, should include a monitoring and
enforcement structure which would insure protection of United States rights under
agreements negotiated pursuant to the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations and all other elements of multilateral and bilateral international trade
agreements. The proposal should result in an upgrading of commercial programs and
commercial attaches overseas to assure that United States trading partners are meeting
their trade agreement obligations, particularly those entered into under such
agreements, including the tendering procedures of the Agreement on Government
Procurement.
Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, 314 (1979). Congress chose the deadline of July 10 because
Congress anticipated that it would formally receive the proposed Trade Agreements Act dur-
ing the summer. Congress, in essence, pressured the executive into setting a deadline, in draft
legislation, for producing a reorganization proposal. Failure to meet this deadline would en-
sure delay or failure of the enactment of the legislation.
6. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 69,273 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reorg.
Plan]. See also President's Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 3
of 1979, 39 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1729 (Sept. 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
President's Message].
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executive order on January 2, 1980.7
The reorganization was designed to facilitate implementation of the
MTN and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. The reorganization also
attempts to achieve many broader goals, including more aggressive
promotion of U.S. exports and stronger enforcement of U.S. laws against
unfair import competition.8 Furthermore, the reorganization attempts to
improve coordination between trade policy and other federal policies, to
enhance the priority of trade programs relative to other federal programs,
and to achieve more vigorous representation of U.S. trade interests in
international forums.9
This article describes the evolution of the administrative structure for
the conduct of international trade and explores the problems inherent in
this structure. The article then describes the new reorganization and raises
questions whether the above goals can be achieved by merely shifting
responsibilities among federal agencies. Finally, the article speculates
about the future effects of the reorganization on U.S. international trade.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to regulate "commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states"'10 and to enact all laws "nec-
essary and proper"" to exercise this power. Pursuant to this grant of
power, Congress has delegated to the executive branch the authority to
conduct most of the government's international trade activities, including
the administration of the laws remedying unfair import competition, 12 the
7. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
8. See OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET-INTERNATIONAL
TRADE REORGANIZATION 1 (January 2, 1980).
9. Id; see generally Executive Office of the President-Office of Management and
Budget, Statement of James T. McIntyre, Director of Office of Management and Budget
Before the Trade Subcommittee of the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives (September 6, 1979).
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
11. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
12. The most important remedies for unfair import competition are the antidumping law
and the countervailing duty law. The antidumping law, Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 731-740, 19 U.S.
C.A. § 1673 (West 1980), added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93
Stat. 144, authorizes the executive branch to impose a duty upon imports sold in the United
States at less than fair value which cause material injury to U.S. domestic industry.
For a discussion of the antidumping law, see Jacobs & Hove, Remediesfor Unfair Import
Competition in the United States, 13 CORNELL INT'L. L. J. 1, 5-13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Remedies].
The countervailing duty law, Tariff Act of 1930, §§ 701-707, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (West
1980), added by Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 101, 93 Stat. 144, autho-
1980]
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imposition of temporary import restrictions to help U.S. producers adjust to
fair but injurious import competition,' 3 and the reduction of tariffs pursu-
ant to international agreements. 14 Since Congress can withdraw or modify
this authority, however, Congress exercises a powerful influence over the
executive branch's administration of trade activities.
Dissatisfaction with the executive branch's conduct of trade activity
prompted Congress, in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,15 to reorganize
executive trade policymaking. In section 241 of that Act, Congress created
the position of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations (STR),
placed the STR within the Executive Office of the President, and authorized
the STR to be the chief representative for U.S. trade negotiations.' 6 In ad-
dition, section 241 authorized the STR to be chairman of a cabinet level
Trade Policy Committee (TPC).17 This committee, whose membership in-
cluded the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, and Treas-
ury, 18 was intended to provide overall trade policy guidance.' 9
By creating the STR position, Congress served two purposes. First,
Congress withdrew the trade negotiation function from the State Depart-
ment. It was widely believed that during trade negotiations, State had
rizes the executive branch to impose a duty upon certain imports aided by the payment of a
"bounty or grant" from a foreign government. If the product is imported from specified coun-
tries, the countervailing duty law also requires a finding to the effect that the imports benefiting
from bounties or grants result in material injury to a U.S. industry. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671 (West
1980). For a discussion of the countervailing duty law, see Remedies, supra, at 13-17.
13. The "escape clause" sections of the Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 225 1-
2253 (1976), grant the executive branch the authority to temporarily limit increasing imports
that are a "substantial cause of serious injury" to U.S. producers. For a discussion of the
escape clause remedies, see Remedies, supra note 12, at 21-23.
14. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-316, 48 Stat. 943 (cur-
rent version at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976)), originally granted the President the authority to nego-
tiate and implement agreements with foreign countries to reduce tariffs if such reduction
would expand foreign markets. Congress periodically renewed this authority and supplanted
it with new grants of authority to negotiate and implement tariff agreements in section 201 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, see note 15 infra, and in section 101 of the Trade Act of
1974, see note 31 infra. For a discussion of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, see gener-
ally H. TASCA, THE RECIPROCAL TRADE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES (1938); G. BECKETr,
THE RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM (1940).
15. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (current version in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.A.
(West 1980)).
16. Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872, 878 (repealed 1975).
17. Id.
18. Section 242 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1872 (1976), requires the
President to establish an interagency organization composed of the STR and "the heads of
such departments and of such other officers as the President shall designate." Pursuant to this
provision, President Kennedy, by Executive Order No. 11,075, 18 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), cre-
ated the Trade Policy Committee and appointed the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Commerce,
Agriculture, Labor, Interior, and Defense to be members.
19. 19 U.S.C. § 1872 (1976).
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given other nations easy access to the U.S. market in order to attain unre-
lated foreign policy goals. By creating the STR position, Congress reaf-
firmed its intention that trade negotiations would result in reciprocal
exchanges of trade benefits and that trade negotiators should consider not
only foreign policy matters, but domestic economic and political concerns
as well.2 0 Second, Congress gave responsibility for trade negotiations to a
bureaucratically neutral party who could balance the competing interests of
the State, Commerce, Agriculture, and Treasury Departments. 2 1 Since
trade policy cuts across many areas of domestic policymaking, the positions
that each department strives to promote in trade negotiations frequently
conffict. The STR, as a member of the Executive Office of the President
and as chairman of the TPC, was in a position to coordinate the diverse
policies of other departments, thereby developing more objective and uni-
fied U.S. negotiating positions.
This new executive structure functioned reasonably well throughout
the Kennedy Round negotiations,2 2 which were held from 1962 to 1967. In
the late 1960's, however, U.S. manufacturers and labor unions began to
express extreme dissatisfaction with the terms and the administration of
U.S. laws regulating import competition. One such law provoking great
dissatisfaction was the U.S. "escape clause" law.2 3 The "escape clause"
permits domestic industries that have been injured by increased import
competition to petition the executive branch for temporary restrictions,
such as increased tariffs or the imposition of quotas, on the injurious im-
ports.24 The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 tightened the eligibility criteria
for receiving escape clause protection,25 and during the economic boom of
the 1960's, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were not inclined to
grant escape clause relief.
20. H.R. REP. No. 571, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1973).
21. Id.
22. For accounts of the Kennedy Round negotiations, see generally J. EVAN, THE KEN-
NEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: THE TWILIGHT OF THE GATIT?. (1971); E.
PREEG, TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS (1970).
23. See note 13 supra.
24. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
25. Section 201 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, 65
Stat. 72 (repealed 1962), provided relief to producers who could show that an increase in im-
ports "had contributed substantially towards causing or threatening serious injury."
Section 301 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (repealed
1975), significantly tightened the eligibility criteria by requiring the producer to prove that the
increase in imports is "the majorfactor in causing, or threatening to cause, such injury." (em-
phasis added). This tightening of the eligibility criteria seriously reduced the availability of
escape clause relief. See Metzger, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEO. L.J. 425, 447-48
(1963); Note; Comparison of Standardsfor Injury Under Escape Clause Procedure and the An-
tidumpingAd, 29 U. PITT. L. REv. 435, 436 (1968).
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United States manufacturers and labor unions also expressed dissatis-
faction with Treasury's loose administration of the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws.26 These statutes imposed no deadline for completing
antidumping or countervailing duty investigations. Consequently, Treas-
ury, perhaps inspired by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations' gen-
eral reluctance to impose increased import restrictions, tended to defer
indefinitely many of these investigations. 27
The economic problems of the early 1970's prompted further dissatis-
faction with the prevailing trade policies. More than previously, the United
States faced stiff import competition from Japan, European nations, and
advanced developing countries.. In 1971, the United States experienced its
first balance of trade deficit of this century.28 Many multinational compa-
nies moved their manufacturing operations abroad, thereby eliminating
U.S. jobs, at least in the short run.29 The value of the dollar plummeted
and the OPEC embargo and oil price increases contributed further to the
already existing problems of high unemployment and inflation. These diffi-
culties increased the domestic political pressures for tighter restrictions
upon import competition.
Congress responded to this widespread dissatisfaction by very nearly
enacting legislation requiring the imposition of import quotas to protect
several powerful manufacturing sectors.30 After these proposals failed, the
Nixon Administration seized the initiative by submitting legislation to au-
thorize U.S. participation in a major new round of international trade nego-
tiations. This proposal became the Trade Act of 1974,3 1 which not only
authorized U.S. participation in the MTN, but also amended U.S. laws reg-
26. For a discussion of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, see note 12 supra.
27. See King, Countervailing Duties-An Old Remedy with New Appeal, 24 Bus. LAW.
1179, 1191 (1969); Butler, Countervailing Duties andExport Subsidization." A Re-emerging Issue
in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 82, 134 (1969).
28. See generaly DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(1971).
29. See Muller, .4 Qualflying and Dissenting View of the Multinational Corporation, in
GLOBAL COMPANIES 21-41 (1975).
30. H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), proposed as the "Trade Act of 1970," also
known as the "Mills Bill," was passed by the House of Representatives and was considered
seriously by the Senate before failing with the adjournment of the 91st Congress. This bill
would have imposed mandatory import quotas for textiles and shoes, and it would have au-
thorized the imposition of quotas for other categories of products for which import competi-
tion was significant and growing. For an analysis of this bill, see Rehm, Proposed TradeAct of
1970: What Direction U.S. Foreign Trade Policy 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 289 (1971). In 1971,
Senator Vance Hartke and Congressman James Burke introduced, with the support of the
AFL-CIO, a "Foreign Trade and Investment Act," also known as the "Burke-Hartke Bill,"
which not only provided for extensive quotas to protect existing domestic market shares of
U.S. producers, but which also would have discouraged investment abroad by U.S. companies.
31. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976) (amended 1979).
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ulating import competition and provided for the second mini-reorganiza-
tion of trade policymaking to be undertaken in twelve years.
More specifically, the Trade Act of 1974 considerably tightened Treas-
ury's administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws by
imposing time limits for the completion of investigations. 32 Furthermore,
the Act relaxed the eligibility criteria for a U.S. industry to receive escape
clause protection, 33 thereby making escape clause relief more available to
U.S. industries. Finally, the Act elevated the STR position from subcabinet
to cabinet level, and placed the STR's supporting bureaucracy on a statu-
tory basis.34
The Trade Act of 1974, however, failed to eliminate many of the
problems inherent in the existing trade policymaking framework. Major
problems still existed in the administration of trade laws, the formulation of
trade policy, the promotion of exports, and the negotiation of trade agree-
ments.
The Treasury Department continued to be the target of private sector
criticism and frustration with the government's perceived inability to deal
with "unfair" import competition. In particular, Treasury fell far behind in
its collection of antidumping duties. In one highly publicized case, Televi-
sion Receiving Setsfrom Japan,35 Treasury failed for several years to collect
antidumping duties owed by more than one hundred Japanese importers of
television receivers. 3 6 By 1979, this backlog of unpaid duties became such a
political embarrassment and a drain on administrative resources that the
32. In countervailing duty cases, the Act gave Treasury six months to make a preliminary
determination, and twelve months to make a final determination of whether imports had
benefitted from a bounty or grant by a foreign government. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 331(a), 88
Stat. 2083 (1975) (current verison at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1303(b)(A) (West 1980)).
In dumping cases, the Act required that Treasury make a preliminary dumping determin-
tion within six months (nine months in complicated cases); that the International Trade Com-
mission determine within three months thereafter whether the dumping injured a competing
U.S. industry; and, that Treasury make its final dumping determination within three subse-
quent months. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 321, 88 Stat. 2043 (1975) (current version at 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 160 (West 1980)).
33. Section 201(b)(l) of the Trade Act of 1974 eliminated the requirement that a com-
plainant demonstrate that an increase in import competition resulting from concessions
granted under trade agreements caused injury to a domestic industry. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2251(b)(1)(1976).
34. Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141, 88 Stat. 1999 (1975)(current version at 19 U.S.C. § 2171
(1976)). Previously, only the position of the STR had been authorized by statute. President
Kennedy, not Congress, created the supporting bureacracy of the STR Office in Executive
Order No. 11,075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963). Placing the STR supporting bureaucracy on a
statutory basis was significant because it prohibited the President from abolishing the STR
Office without Congressional approval.
35. U.S. TARIFF COMM'N PUB. No. 367 (1971).
36. See Administration of the Ant/dumping Act of 1921, Assessment and Collection ofDuties
Under the Antidumping Act of1921, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House
1980]
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government agreed to settle all outstanding claims for antidumping duties
upon the payment by television importers of some $66 million of the $138
million of duties that were originally said to be owed.37
Trade policy was not well coordinated and no single spokesman for the
executive's trade policy existed. Officials responsible for trade policymak-
ing rarely communicated with the officials responsible for tax, investment,
antitrust, and environmental policies, all of which bear upon trade policy in
some fashion. At least twelve agencies took relatively uncoordinated and
often contradictory trade policy actions.38 Many of these agencies
subordinated trade policy concerns to other policy concerns promoted by
advocates in the Administration that were more effective than trade policy
advocates.
United States export promotion efforts were clearly deficient. Busi-
nessmen complained about antitrust laws that discouraged joint ventures
for research and development, tax reforms that reduced exemptions for
Americans living abroad, the absence of direct export incentives such as
those used by the Japanese and Western European governments, and the
existence of several direct disincentives for exports. 39 Organizational weak-
Committee on Ways and Means. 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 8 (1978) (statement of Robert H.
Mundheim, General Counsel of the Treasury Department).
37. Wall Street Journal, Apr. 29, 1980, at 2, col. 3. On May 9, 1980, however, the U.S.
Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. enjoined the implementation of this settlement until the
court reviews a related appeal. Japan Insight, United States - Japan Trade Council, no. 19, p.
8 (May 16, 1980).
38. Cabinet Departments responsible for activities affecting some aspect of trade included:
(1) State-responsible for East-West trade negotiations, the negotiation of commodity agree-
ments and general foreign policy; (2) Treasury-responsible for antidumping and counter-
vailing duty investigations, the administration of national security trade restrictions and
general economic policy; (3) Commerce--serves as liaison to the business community, respon-
sible for export promotion and the administration of adjustment assistance to domestic firms;
(4) Agriculture--serves as liaison to domestic agricultural interests and the Foreign Agricul-
tural Service, responsible for price supports and related import restrictions; (5) Labor--serves
as liaison to domestic labor, responsible for the administration of adjustment assistance to
workers; (6) Interior-responsible for the formulation of policies regarding minerals and raw
materials; (7) Defense-responsible for all trade matters related to national security and for
the trade of strategic materials; (8) Energy-responsible for oil import policy and for other
energy-trade matters.
Other federal agencies conducting activities affecting trade included: (1) the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission-statutory responsibility to conduct investigations to determine
whether import competition has injured U.S. industries and to conduct investigations of al-
leged infringements of U.S. patents; (2) the U.S. Export-Import Bank-responsible for finan-
cing U.S. export sales; (3) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation-insurer against risks
attributable to investment in developing countries; (4) the Council of Economic Advisors; (5)
the National Security Council; (6) the Agency for International Development; and, (7) the
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
39. See generally Special Report, U.S. Export Policy. New Directions, WASHINGTON IN-
TERNATIONAL BUSINESS REPORT (December, 1978).
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nesses accounted for at least part of the poor U.S. export promotion efforts.
For example, the Export-Import Bank4o had no organizational ties to the
export promotion efforts of the Commerce Department. Furthermore,
neither the Export-Import Bank nor Commerce coordinated their export
promotion efforts with other elements of U.S. trade and economic policy.
Although the STR had been responsible for U.S. representation in the
GATT rounds of trade negotiations since 1962, other negotiations that di-
rectly affected U.S. trade remained the responsibilities of other agencies.
For example, the State Department retained control of the "East-West" ne-
gotiations between the United States and state-controlled economies. State
also retained control of "commodity" negotiations aimed at stabilizing
world prices for such primary commodities as coffee, cocoa, and tin. The
STR Office and the State Department periodically battled for the chance to
represent the United States in GATT matters other than the multilateral
trade negotiations and on trade issues arising in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development. The fact that no single agency rep-
resented the United States in all international trade negotiations was
further evidence of the absence of coordination in U.S. trade policymaking.
II
THE REORGANIZATION OF 1979
A. THE ALTERNATIVES
By early 1978, dissatisfaction prompted Congress as well as members
of the private sector to discuss possibilities for reform of the executive trade
machinery. Such reform could take one of two directions. On one hand,
the reform could consolidate responsibility for all trade actions into one
new trade department. This consolidation approach would provide a fresh
start in trade policymaking and would clearly increase the priority given to
trade matters. Skeptics of the consolidation approach, however, warned
that consolidation would entail the creation of another large bureaucracy
and that mere creation of an independent trade department would not elim-
inate the competing institutionalized trade policy interests of State, Labor,
Agriculture, and Commerce.
On the other hand, the reform could leave the responsibility for trade
activity scattered among many executive agencies, and could designate a
"lead agency" to be responsible for coordination of all trade activities that
these other agencies conduct. This coordination approach would avoid the
creation of still another bureaucracy. A danger of this approach was that
40. The Export-Import Bank attempts to promote exports by extending credit to foreign
purchasers of U.S. goods.
1980]
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the most obvious candidates for "lead agency" appeared unfit for this role.
For example, State and Treasury each had well-established roles outside
the trade area that biased their trade policy concerns. Such bias could
cause either of these departments to again subordinate trade policy interests
to the department's own broader institutional concerns. Commerce, an-
other possible candidate for "lead agency," was widely perceived to lack the
vigor and influence that a leadership role in trade policy requires.41
By the time President Carter submitted the Tokyo Round agreements
and their implementing legislation to the Congress in June, 1979, several
members of Congress had submitted formal proposals for trade reorganiza-
tion. These proposals represented three basic viewpoints. The "maximal-
ist" approach favored the creation of a new cabinet position to manage all
trade activity.42 By contrast, the "minimalist" approach merely favored a
shift of responsibility for trade activity among existing agencies. 43 Support-
ers of the "minimalist" approach proposed to shift the responsibility for the
enforcement of unfair trade laws from Treasury to Commerce, 44 to shift
responsibility for East-West trade negotiations and commodity agreements
from the State Department to the STR,45 and to merge the U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission with the Department of Commerce and Interna-
tional Trade.46
The third approach struck a compromise between the first two ap-
proaches.4 7 The compromise approach sought to centralize trade activity in
a new Special Trade Agency,48 modeled after the STR office, without estab-
lishing a new department of trade within the Executive Office. This new
agency would assume responsibility for enforcement of antidumping and
countervailing duty laws 49 and promotion of U.S. exports.5 0 In addition,
41. Some suggested that the President create a White House Council, similar to the Coun-
cil on International Economic Policy that had functioned in the early 1970's, to assume the
role of "lead agency." The inefficiency of the CIEP led to its demise in 1976 when Congress
failed to extend its statutory authority. For a discussion of the CIEP's performance, see I.M.
DESTLER, MAKING FOREIGN EcoNoMic POLICY 213-14 (1980). Such inefficiency made a
CIEP-type agency likewise seem unfit for the role of "lead agency."
42. The "maximalist" proposals were submitted as bills by Senators Ribicoffand Roth, S.
1990, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 377, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Senator Byrd, S. 891,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); and Representative Neal, H.R. 3859, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
43. The "minimalist" approach was sponsored in a bill by Representatives Jones and
Frenzel, H.R. 4567, 96th Cong., lst'Sess. (1979).
44. Id. § 204(a)(I).
45. Id. § 205.
46. Id. § 204(a)(2).
47. The compromise approach was sponsored in a bill by Representative Long, H.R. 4995,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
48. Id. § 102(1).
49. Id. § 203(2)(A).
50. Id. § 203(3).
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the proposal provided for establishment of a Trade Coordinating Council
within the White House to coordinate the trade policy activities conducted
by other agencies. The STR would head both the agency and the council.5'
B. THE REORGANIZATION
In September, 1979, President Carter, responding to congressional
pressure, 52 submitted to Congress the reorganization plan jointly formu-
lated by his administration,5 3 the Senate Finance Committee,54 and the
House Ways and Means Committee.55 Neither house of Congress voted to
nullify the proposal within 60 days, and in failing to do so, authorized the
President to implement the plan.5 6 President Carter did so by issuing an
executive order 57 on January 2, 1980.
The new reorganization closely resembled the "minimalist" approach.
The authors of the plan rejected the "maximalist" approach for three rea-
sons. First, they feared that a new department would merely enlarge the
federal bureaucracy without eliminating attempts by other departments to
influence trade policy. Second, creation of a new department requires mas-
sive restructuring that could have paralyzed trade policymaking and the
enforcement of import laws at the same time that the Tokyo Round agree-
ments and the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 were first taking effect.
Third, the administrative chaos surrounding the birth of the Departments
of Energy and Education in the fall of 1979 made that time a poor political
season in which to attempt the creation of still another cabinet department.
The authors rejected the compromise approach because it suffered from the
same defects as did the "maximalist" proposal without offering any signifi-
cant commensurate advantages.
The reorganization concentrated nearly all trade responsibilities within
the Department of Commerce and the Office of the STR, thereby drasti-
cally reducing the roles played by State and Treasury. In general, the reor-
51. Id. § 301.
52. See note 5 supra.
53. For the Administration's proposal, see Reorg. Plan and President's Message, note 6
S.upra.
54. The Senate Finance Committee submitted its recommendations in REORGANIZATION
PLAN No. 3 OF 1979, S. REP. No. 96-402, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1979).
55. The House Ways and Means Committee submitted its recommendations in REOR-
OANIZATION PLAN No. 3 OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-585, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1979).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1976) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise provided under subsection (c) of this section, a reorganiza-
tion plan is effective at the end of the first period of sixty calendar days of continuous
session of Congress after the date on which the plan is transmitted to it unless, between
-the date of transmittal and the end of the sixty-day period, either House passes a
resolution stating in substance that the House does not favor the reorganization plan.
57. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980).
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ganization consolidated responsibility for the administration of all trade
programs and day to day trade operations in Commerce. The plan vested
the STR with responsibility for the formulation and coordination of trade
policy and for the conduct of all international trade negotiations.
More specifically, the plan transferred to Commerce the responsibility
for the administration of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws.58
Because "trade is the primary mission"' 59 of Commerce, the President
thought that Commerce could perform these duties more efficiently and ef-
fectively than Treasury.60
In order to place all export promotion activities in a single organiza-
tion,6 ' the plan transferred to Commerce responsibility for all foreign com-
mercial representation.62 Commerce would also be responsible for the
coordination of its own export promotion efforts with those of the U.S. Ex-
port-Import Bank.63 In order to achieve this coordination, the plan made
the Secretary of Commerce a member of the Board of Directors of the Ex-
port-Import Bank.6a
The plan also charged Commerce with responsibility for the imple-
mentation of the MTN agreements. 65 President Carter explicitly recog-
nized that the Tokyo Round agreements not only created new opportunities
for the United States, but imposed new obligations on all contracting na-
tions as well.66 Commerce will be responsible for seizing those opportuni-
ties and for monitoring compliance with those obligations. The President
further ordered that Commerce operate a Trade Complaint Center where
U.S. domestic interests could register complaints and obtain information
regarding available remedies for violations of the MTN agreements. 67
Commerce will retain control over export controls, trade adjustment assist-
ance for firms and communities, and the research of trade problems.68
More significantly, the plan strengthened the trade bureaucracy of
Commerce by restructuring the Department itself. The plan created several
new positions. The Deputy Secretary of Commerce will serve as an assis-
58. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 2a.
59. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1732.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 2a.
63. Id.
64. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 3.
65. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 2a. For a discussion of the activities that the Plan requires
Commerce to conduct to fulfill its responsibility for MTN implementation, see President's
Message, supra note 6, at 1733.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 2a.
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tant to the Secretary and will have responsibilities in all areas of Com-
merce.69 The Undersecretary of Commerce for International Trade will
have overall responsibility for all trade programs.70 The Assistant Secre-
tary for Trade Administration will administer the antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty laws,7 1 and the Assistant Secretary for Export Development
will be responsible for promotion of U.S. exports and for all foreign com-
mercial representation.72 Finally, the Assistant Secretary for Trade Policy
and Programs, occupying an already existing position, will be responsible
for MTN implementation. 73 Creation of positions responsible only for
trade activity guaranteed that Commerce will devote more attention to
trade activities, especially export promotion.
The plan changed the name of the STR to the United States Trade
Representative (USTR).74 While the plan assigned to Commerce the re-
sponsibility for the day to day administration of the unfair trade laws, ex-
port development programs, and MTN implementation, the plan vested the
USTR with the responsibility for policy supervision and overall coordina-
tion of all three areas.75
The plan charged the USTR with responsibility for representing the
United States in all trade negotiations regarding GATT matters, 76 East-
West trade,77 commodity agreements, 78 and matters considered by both the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).79
The plan made the USTR responsible for the daily conduct of negotia-
tions of specific issues as well as for the development of long term policies
and strategies for negotiation.8 0 The assignment to the USTR of responsi-
bility for the daily conduct of negotiations was intended to insure "that all
trade negotiations are handled consistently and that our negotiation lever-
age is employed to the maximum .... ."81 The plan created the Trade
Negotiations Committee, chaired by the USTR and composed of Com-
merce, State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Labor, to coordinate these daily
69. Id. § 2(b)(1).
70. Id. § 2(c). See also President's Message, supra note 6, at 1732.
71. Id.
72. Id. These two Assistant Secretary positions were created by Reorg. Plan, supra note 6,
§ 2d.
73. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1733.
74. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 1(a).
75. Id. § 1(b)(3).
76. Id. § l(b)(3)(A).
77. Id. § l(b)(3)(E).
78. Id.
79. Id. § l(b)(3)(A).
80. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1731.
81. Id.
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operational aspects of trade negotiations.82 In addition, USTR would be
responsible for formulation and implementation of U.S. international in-
vestment policy8 3 and for the coordination of all trade matters involving
energy. 84
To facilitate performance of these duties, the plan made the USTR a
member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Policies8 5 and of the Boards of Directors of the Export-Import
Bank8 6 and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 87
The plan provides that the Trade Policy Committee (TPC), a cabinet-
level interagency committee composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury,
Defense, Interior, Commerce, Labor, and Energy, the Attorney General,
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Chairman of
the Council of Economic Advisors, would serve as the USTR's principal
advisor.8 8 The plan expanded the TPC to include the Secretary of Trans-
portation, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and
the Director of the U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency,
and elevated the Secretary of Commerce to the position of the Vice Chair-
man of the TPC.89 The plan expands the responsibilities of the TPC to
coincide with the new responsibilities of the USTR.90
Finally, the plan made the USTR the principal advisor to the President
on international trade policy and charged the USTR with responsibility for
advising the President on the impact of other policies of the U.S. govern-
ment on international trade.9 1
III
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
The new reorganization is a positive step toward solving many of the
problems attributable to the previously disorganized administrative frame-
work for trade activity. Nevertheless, the plan may face some serious
problems. When proposing his reorganization plan to Congress, President
Carter stated, "[T]hese improvements will be achieved with no increase in
personnel or expenditures except for an annual expenditure of about
82. Id.
83. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § l(b)(3)(C).
84. Id. § l(b)(3)(F).
85. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1731.
86. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § 3.
87. Id. § 4(a).
88. Zd. § l(b)(1).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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$300,000 for the salaries and clerical support of the three additional senior
Commerce Department officials .... "92 The subsequent fiscal restraints
that President Carter announced on March 13, 1980,93 have presumably
strengthened his resolve of the previous September to spend no additional
funds on the trade reorganization. It would appear, however, that the goals
of this massive restructuring effort cannot possibly be fully achieved with-
out some increase in expenditures.
Failure to increase personnel, for example, could easily be a ground for
skepticism. At the height of the Tokyo Round negotiations, the USTR Of-
fice employed about seventy professionals, most of whom were stretched to
the limit with their respective duties. The plan has made the USTR Office
responsible for large new policy areas without providing for any increase in
personnel. The USTR can and has disguised the swelling of the Executive
Office of the President by "detailing" employees of Commerce, Agriculture,
and State to the U.STR Office, thereby hiding personnel increases in the
budgets of other departments. A high quality office, however, cannot easily
be built through dependence upon temporary "detailees" from other de-
partments.
A second potential problem stems from the apparent scope of the
USTR's functions under the plan. If the words of the plan are taken liter-
ally, this new assignment of functions to the USTR would radically alter
the way the United States conducts its broader foreign policy by allowing
the USTR, as the spokesman for trade policy, to control other important
segments of U.S. foreign relations. This result would have a certain nice
irony because it would be a mirror image of the problems that gave rise to
creation of the USTR position in the first place.94 Such result, however, is
unlikely to be workable, or permitted, in practice.
For example, the assignment to the USTR of responsibility for "trade
issues involving energy"95 surely does not mean that the USTR will now
take over price negotiations with the OPEC nations - a subject fraught
with policy implications far broader than those usually associated with
trade in goods. Similarly, the assignment of responsibility for "East-West
trade matters" probably does not mean that the USTR may revive the issue
of Soviet emigration in order to explore possibilities for granting most-fa-
vored nation status to the Soviet Union, or that the USTR may initiate
discussions leading toward lifting the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.
92. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1734.
93. N.Y. Times, March 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
94. See notes 16-21 supra and accompanying text.
95. Reorg. Plan, supra note 6, § l(b)(3)(F).
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Clearly, such issues require coordination of not only the trade policy
actions of various agencies, but coordination of U.S. trade policy with
larger foreign and economic policy goals as well. It is unlikely that the
reorganization will greatly alter the means of making policy regarding such
issues. When extremely volatile issues affect more than one agency, the
working relationship that evolves between the affected agencies, the force of
personality and viewpoint, access to the President, and enjoyment of the
President's confidence usually determine who will predominate. Therefore,
although the plan appears to assign lead responsibility to the USTR on
some of these issues, other agencies may ultimately assume this responsibil-
ity. The full scope of the USTR's new responsibilities will not be known
until the working relationship evolves between the USTR, the Departments
of State and Energy, and the National Security Council.
The third problem involves the relationship between the USTR and
Commerce in antidumping and countervailing duty matters. While the
plan assigns Commerce responsibility for conducting antidumping and
countervailing duty investigations, it assigns the USTR responsibility for
"policy oversight" and "coordination" with respect to those investigations.
The USTR is to exercise this vaguely defined oversight "to the extent le-
gally permissible" 96 and should direct this oversight "toward the establish-
ment of new precedents, negotiation of assurances, and coordination with
other trade matters. . . ,,97 The line between the USTR's responsibilities
for overall policy guidance and Commerce's responsibility for administer-
ing specific statutory procedures is undefined. The amended antidumping
and countervailing duty laws contribute to the uncertainty by authorizing
the USTR to negotiate agreements, with foreign producers in antidumping
cases and with foreign governments in countervailing duty cases, in which
the United States would terminate U.S. investigations in return for certain
assurances regarding the foreign export practices.98 The ultimate delinea-
tion of responsibilities will evolve with practice, but until then, conflicts are
sure to arise.
A fourth problem lies in the area of export promotion. The new export
promotion responsibilities of Commerce could become merely the latest in
a series of largely unsuccessful export initiatives of the last decade. These
initiatives have shown that U.S. competitiveness will not improve through
mere "jawboning" in the absence of basic policy changes. The interna-
tional competitive difficulties of the United States stem from a long period
of inadequate capital formation, poor productivity, lagging innovation,
96. President's Message, supra note 6, at 1730.
97. Id.
98. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1671-1673 (West 1980).
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aimless federal research and development programs that support dying in-
dustries at the expense of the most competitive ones, and disincentives writ-
ten into the tax, antitrust, and other laws. The United States could
effectively cure these competitive difficulties only through policy changes
that would eliminate these underlying causes. Although the reorganization
will result in the devotion of more attention to basic changes in these areas,
it cannot itself effect the underlying policy changes that could remedy these
difficulties. Therefore, the prospects for significant improvement of U.S.
export figures as a result of the reorganization alone are gloomy.
CONCLUSION
The reorganization of 1979 promises some relief from one of the
United States' biggest problems in international trade-the absence of a
coherent national trade policy. Mere shifting of responsibilities among
agencies, however, in the absence of specific policy changes cannot totally
alleviate this problem. In addition, the shifting of many responsibilities at
this time could detract from the most immediate business of the federal
trade establishment-to hold the trading system together, to make the
Tokyo Round agreements work, and to get the new U.S. trade law off to a
successful start. Inevitably, there will be a period of transition as new per-
sons and agencies adjust to new roles. How quickly and effectively these
roles are assumed will in large part determine not only the success of the
reorganization, but also, the success of the entire Tokyo Round endeavor.
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